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The demand for corporate equity is influenced by the preferences of
households for investing their wealth, by the financial market structure
through which intermediation occurs, and by the investment behavior of
financial institutions. Financial institutions have assumed an ever increas-
ing role in the market for corporate stock. The causes are twofold—a
gradual shift in household preferences away from direct holdings of stocks
in favor of indirect holdings through mutual fund shares and pension
savings, and a change in the investment strategy of institutions in favor of
stocks.
Household preferences for financial savings are discussed in section 2
below. Households may choose among a wide range of alternative means of
holding financial assets, each with different attributes (expected return,
variance of return, marketability, negotiability). Financial intermediation
has grown increasingly specialized in the postwar period as particular types
of institutions adapted to meet specific needs of different borrowers and
lenders. While fund flows to financial intermediaries are dominated by
rather strong trends, in the short run there are notable fluctuations..in the
flows of household savings to different types of financial intermediaries in
response to changes in income, prices, interest rates, and stock prices.
Both the trend and cyclic variations in savings flows to financial institu-
tions influence these institutions' investment decisions.
The investment strategiesof financialinstitutionsdiffer widely.
Historically, institutional considerations have been the most important
determinant of investment portfolios. For example, there are statutory
restrictions on the types of investments that some institutions may make.The Demand for Corporate Stock 205
Fiduciarytnistees operate in a context established by statute, the courts,
and traditions. This institutional environment has evolved very slowly,
and hence investment portfolios of financial institutions in the postwar
period are characterized by rather stable trends. Changing stock market
prices or rates of return on other financial assets appear to exert a relatively
minor influence on institutions' portfolio decisions. The most dramatic shift
in the demand for corporate equities occurred only near the end of the
period—since 1967—when life, fire, and casualty insurance companies,
state and local retirement funds, and corporate pension funds all very
sharply increased their share of new funds invested in corporate stock. The
investment decisions by financial institutions, particularly their decisions
regarding common stock, are discussed in sections 3 and 4, with special
attention devoted to the period since 1967.
2.FINANCIALSAVINGS BY THE HOUSEHOLD SECTOR
a. Issues in Model SpecUication and Estimation
Household financial saving shifted over several decades from real assets
(residential housing, farms, unincorporated businesses, and so on) to
financial assets. This trend has continued in the postwar period. Continued
industrialization, a longer life span, and greater reliance on group over
self-insurance have all been contributing causes.1 In addition, the value
of corporate stock increased much more than income as a result of the
increase in price-earnings multiples during the 1950's. Thus, while saving
as a percentage of income has been constant, household holdings of
financial assets have grown more rapidly than income in the postwar
period. As shown in Table. 5-1, the ratio of household financial assets to
income has risen from slightly less than 2 in 1950 to 21 in 1968.
The long-run trends in household choices among financial assets are
evident in Table 5-1. Most notable is the huge rise in the value of corporate
stock holdings, from $155 billion in 1951 to $873 billion in 1968. This
accounts for most of the increase in household holdings of marketable
securities. Households have only moderately increased their net purchases
of bonds and other fixed-income securities. While the value of their cor-
porate stock holdings has risen continuously, households have shifted from
being net purchasers of corporate stock to being large net sellers over
this time period. That household stockholdings have increased in recent
years in spite of households' net sales is attributable to increases in equity
prices.
'Raymond W. Goldsmith, The Flow of Capital Funds in the Postwar Economy, New York,





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0The Demand for Corporate Stock 207
Notesto Table 5-1
SouRcE:Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts
1945—1968, 1970.
Including personal trust funds and nonprofit institutions.
bExcludingnet investment in corporate business.
cPeriodending with year indicated at top of column.
Conventional portfolio theory of asset management provides the con-
ceptual framework for empirically analyzing the interrelationships be-
tween alternative forms of financial asset holdings and their changes.
In conventional portfolio theory, desired financial asset holdings are
assumed to be positively related to income and expected asset prices or
rates of Uncertainty is represented by including higher moments
of the joint probability distribution for rates of return for the different
types of assets. Most analysis has focused on the variance, with investors
assumed to accept greater risk in exchange for a higher expected return.
If there are positive covariances between rates of return of different
types of assets, the investor trying to achieve the least risk associated
with any target expected return will diversify his portfolio.
The simplest representation of the income effect is a positive relation-
ship between desired asset holdings and current income (independent
of other variables such :as asset prices). Assuming changes in asset prices
or other variables are independent of changes in income, observed
savings flows would therefore also be positively related to changes in
income. The common upward trends in income and in the accumulation
of financial assets are such that this type of equation statistically accounts
for a significant share of the total variance in financial flows. However,
while taking full advantage of the common trends, this specification
poorly represents the short-run variations in flows of funds. The above
formulation implies that net additions to financial asset holdings would
have the same sign as changes in income. Aggregate data for the accumu-
lation of most financial assets do not substantiatethis formulation.
Typically, net accumulation of most types of assets continues even when
income falls. More sophisticated versions would introduce lag structures
in the formation of households' expectations regarding changes in income
and asset prices, and in households' reactions to changes in these variables.
Thus, for example, the relevant measure of income to which households
2HarryMarkowitz, Portfolio Selection, New York, Wiley, 1959; Donald Farrar, The
Investment Decision Under Uncertainty, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1962; Donald
H. Hester and James Tdbin, eds., Studies of Portfolio Behavior, Cowles Foundation Mono-
graph 20, New York, Wiley, 1967.208 InstitutionalInvestors
respond might be a weighted sum of current and previous years' incomes.
This would explain the continued accumulation of virtually all types
of financial assets in years when income declines—"permanent" income
based on a lag structure over several years has continually risen though
current income has occasionally declined for one year.
Unfortunately aggregate annual data for the postwar period are in-
sufficient to provide empirical estimates of these more complex models of
the formation of expectations and the associated lag structures. Variables
describing income and the accumulation of financial assets are trend
dominated. These trends make it virtually impossible to test alternative
hypotheses about medium- or longer-term lag structures with a short
annual time series.
However, after certain simplifying assumptions are made, the data do
permit examination of the short-run responses to changes in income and
asset prices. The model below assumes that actual asset holdings in any
time period coincide with desired levels of such holdings. Dynamic stock-
adjustment models in which there are lags in adjustment are popular in
econometric estimation, especially for durable goods. There are several
reasons why no attempt was made to specify lagged adjustment processes
in the model below. The costs of entry into the capital markets are gener-
ally quite low, and "indivisibilities" would not appear to have large
effects on transactions costs for most assets. Low transactions costs greatly
reduce the likelihood that desired and actual asset holdings diverge. Also,
for annual data aggregated for the entire household sector, there is likely
to be little variation over time in the nature of adjustments of actual
holdings to desired levels and certainly little or no prospect of specifying
such differences econometrically with annual time-series data.
Because of data limitations the model does not attempt to choose among
alternative lag structures between income and asset changes. Financial
flows by asset type are linearly related to income, rather than to changes
in income. The dependent variable was expressed in ratio form, the ratio
of net purchases (or sales) of each asset type to income
(1) = fli,xjt
whereequals assets of type i at time 1,is income, andare inde-
pendent variables. An equation was estimated independently for each
asset type i. Since the marginal propensity to save varies from year to
year, it is inappropriate to constrain the estimates of the individualThe Demand for Corporate Stock 209
equationsto a constant savings rate. However, decisions about several
forms of saving are interrelated. Several equations are estimated below
relating ratios of one asset type to another (or to the sum of several others)
to changes in income and asset prices.
This model is based on income and individual asset prices, and excludes
total wealth as an independent variable. Asset prices and wealth are, of
course, related. Changes in interest rates or stock prices appear in most of
the flow equations; these changes are highly correlated to the value of
corporate stock or fixed-income security holdings. Thus, while market
prices or yields are included in the flow equations rather than asset values,
there is no statistical basis for determining whether the correlation of
market prices with flows represents households' reaction to changes in rates
of return or to changes in the market value of particular asset holdings.
This model formulation implies that the ratios of particular asset hold-
ings or total wealth to income may assume different values, depending on
initial conditions and the estimated flow equations. While this assumption
is at variance with conventional portfolio theory, it is substantiated by the
postwar experience. The biggest source of changes in total wealth arises
from changing stock-market prices. Household reactions to rather large
changes in stock prices or the value of their aggregate financial-wealth
holdings, sometimes 20 percent in a year, have, in fact, been rather modest;
no change in aggregate savings is evident, and flows of funds in and out of
stocks in any year are usually less than one percent of total stockholdings.
Thus, short-run changes in total wealth generally do not prove to be
significant in explaining short-run changes in holdings. If the ratio of
total wealth to income matters, the effects occur only over a long period
of time, and are presumably one of the factors influencing the long
trends underlying the data on financial-asset accumulation.
Finally, the equations assume that causation runs from income or capital
market conditions, as represented by interest rates or stock prices, to
household savings rather than vice versa. The implicit causal assumption
in the analysis below is that monetary and fiscal policies interacting with
private demands for goods and services determine income and interest
rates. These in turn affect household saving flows. This is not to deny the
important interdependencies between decisions regarding financial asset
holdings and income or credit market conditions. However, the available
evidence suggests that the lags are long. Changes in household saving
decisions, in fiscal or monetary policies, or in private demand affect the
level and composition of income and the credit markets only after a lag.
Econometric models have made little progress to date in describing the210 InstitutionalInvestors
interrelationships between the processes of financial intermediation and
real economic activity.
The following types of household financial assets are included in the
model below:




F =fixedincome securities (public and private bonds, mortgages)
S =corporatestock
MF =mutualfund holdings.
Annual data from Flow of Funds Accounts 1952-4968 (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System) are used. The distinctions between the
several types of assets in the class securities" are relatively
insignificant in the context of a general model representing aggregate
financial savings decisions. The one significant component of household
savings and financial asset holdings not included is that of "unincorpor-
ated business investment."
In the analysis below, income and expected returns on assets, as reflected
in current and lagged market yields, were employed as explanatory
variables. The sample size was too small to yield significant estimates of the
effects of change in the variance of returns on portfolio choices. Inde-
pendent variables used in the equations included income, interest rates,
and stock yields. Definitions and data sources are as follows:
Y =personalmoney income (billions of dollars) (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts)
RB =rateof return on three- to five-year government securities
(Economic Report of the President)
RS =rateof return on equity; price appreciation plus dividends for
NYSE 500 index (NYSE, Fact Book, 1969)
I =timetrend (assumed values 1, 2,..., 17for this sample)
Since the short-run variations in the several popular stock market indices
are highly correlated, there is little or no advantage statistically in using a
different equity price index. Nor has more of the several available
interest rates series been included. While the yield curve does fluctuate
in the short run, most interest rate variables are highly correlated over
time. Thus, in the equations below, the bond rate variable is a proxy forThe Demand for Corporate Stock 211
allinterest rates; the variable denoting the annual change in interest rates
on bonds serves as a proxy .for changing credit market conditions generally.
b. Empirical Estimates of the Model
1.DemandDeposits. The concept of household preferences for money
balances has been a cornerstone of macroeconomic theory and the subject
of a considerable theoretical literature.3 Several empirical formulations of
such demand functions have been The controversy revolves
around the elasticity of interest rates.
Annual data for the period 1952—68 were used to test the competing
hypotheses. The early postwar years were excluded for two reasons—
• households had acquired unusually large amounts of liquid assets during
World War II, which affected their decisions concerning financial asset
holdings, and the capital markets were substantially affected by the
Federal Reserve System's policy of fixing the interest rate on long-term
Treasury securities at a low level. This policy was abandoned with the
Accord of 1952. The dependent variable in the equation is the share of
income which households used to add to their demand deposits holdings.
(2)
___t
=—99.00+ .4807t —43.63 + 13.60
lTg (1.33)(1.76)(1.91) t—i (1.58)
R2=.4970
D.W.=2.15
where represents the change in demand deposits in year t (millions
ofdollars),is income (billions of dollars), and RB is the bond rate
(three-to five-year governmentsecurities)..
Irving Fisher, The Purchasing Power of Money, New York, Macmillan, 1911; John M.
Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London, Macmillan, 1936;
W. J.Baumol,"The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1952, pp. 545—56; Milton Friedman, "The
Quantity Theory of Money—A Restatement," in The Optimum Quantity of Money and
Other Essays, Chicago, Aidric, 1969; James Tobin, "Liquidity Preferences as Behavior
Toward Risk," Review of Economic Studies, February 1958, pp. 65—68; James Tobin,
"The Interest Elasticity of the Transactions Demand for Cash," Review of Economics and
Statistics, August 1956, pp. 241—47.
Allan Meltzer, "Demand for Money: The Evidence from Time Series." Journal of
Political Economy, June 1963, pp. 219—46; Milton Friedman, "The Demand for Money:
Some Theoretical and Empirical Results," Journal of Political Economy, August 1959,
pp. 327—51; Karl Bruner and Allan Meltzer, "Predicting Velocity," Journal of Finance,
May 1963, pp. 319—34; Gregory Chow, "On the Long-Run and Short-Run Demand for
Money,"Journal of Political Economy, April 1966, pp. 111—31.212 InstitutionalInvestors
The explanatory variables include a time trend, the transactions
demand for money, as evidenced by the significance of the change-in-
income term, and short-run changes in interest rates. The negative co-
efficient of indicates that households economize on their
holdings of demand deposits as interest rates rise in the short run. The
positive coefficient of Vt! implies that one of the responses in the short
run to changes in income is a more than proportionate increase in demand
deposits. As will be seen below, the sum of all financial savings increases
more than proportionally in the short run as income rises. This is
consistent with the econometric literature on consumption functions,
which employ distributed lag functions on income as the explanatory
variable.5
2. Savings Deposits. A similar equation fitted for additions to savings.
deposits includes both the level of interest rates and their short-run
changes. Short-run changes in income did not prove statistically signifi-
cant.




The level of interest rates, reflects a strong trend in the share
of income devoted to savings. The negative coefficient on the interest rate
change variable reflects the process of disintermediation, households
switching from savings accounts to fixed-income securities when interest
rates rise sharply. Interest rate regulation on commercial banks, mutual
savings banks, and savings and loan associations, and other institutional
M. Friedman, A Theoryofthe Consumption Function, Princeton, Princeton University
Press for NBER, 1957; A. Ando and F. Modigliani, "The Life Cycle Hypothesis of
Savings: Aggregate Implications and Tests," American Economic Review, March 1953,
pp. 55—84; H. S. Houthakker and L. D. Taylor, Consumer Demand in the United States,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966; N. Leviatan, "Estimates of Distributed
Lag Consumption Functions from Cross Section Data," Review of Economics and Statistics,
February 1965, pp. 44—53; F. Modigliani and A. Ando, "The Permanent Income and the
Life Cycle Hypothesis of Savings Behavior: Comparisons and Tests," in Proceedings of the
Conference on Consumption and Saving, Vol. 2, Philadelphia, 1960; J. Simon and D. Aigner,
"Cross Section and Time-Series Tests of the Permanent-Income Hypothesis," American
Economic Review, June 1970, pp. 341—51.The Demand for Corporate Stock 213
considerationsare such that interest rates on savings deposits rise less
rapidly than bond rates during periods of tight credit. As a result, dis-
intermediation occurs and households switch to bonds. For example,
during the period 1963 through 1965 households added an average of
$24.4 billion to their savings deposits each year and acquired an average
of $4.2 billion of public and private bonds and mortgages. During the
tight money period of 1966, households acquired $12.9 billion of these
fixed-income securities while increasing their savings deposits by only
$19.0 billion. In 1967, when market rates on bonds had fallen rapidly
relative to savings deposits rates, the pattern was reversed; savings
deposits were increased by $32.5 billion, fixed-income securities by
$3.5 billion. This pattern occurred throughout the postwar period and is
the fundamental source of the countercyclical pattern in mortgage
lending and, hence, in residential construction.
3. Pension Fund Holdings. Pension programs have grown rapidly in the
postwar period. The reasons for this growth have been extensively
described elsewhere.6 Since the Supreme Court ruled in 1948 that fringe
benefits were a proper part of labor contract negotiations, coverage of
pension programs has grown enormously, and both contributions and
benefit payments have risen sharply. Public pension plans for state and
municipal employees also grew rapidly during the 1950's, as did union
and other multiemployer plans.7 Pension retirement plans for
employed individuals received tax free status in 1962 with the Smathers-
Keough Act, which permitted individuals to contribute sums (limited to
$2,500 annually) to a common trust to be managed on a pooled basis.
Liberalization in 1968 resulted in many more such plans being initiated;
100,000 plans registered in 1968 as compared to about half that number
over the previous four years.8
Net fund flows to pension programs are the stablest of all forms of
household financial savings. The equation for pension fund flows, in-
cluding a logarithmic trend and the short-run change in income, is quite
6DanielM. Holland, Private Pension Funds: Projected Growth, Occasional Paper 97, New
York, NBER, 1966; Phillip Cagan, The Effect of Pension Funds on Aggregate Savings: Evidence
from a Sample Survey, Occasional Paper 95, New York, NBER, 1965; and Roger F. Murray,
Economic Aspects of Pensions: A Summary Report, New York, NBER, 1968.
"H. Robert Bartell, Jr., and Elizabeth T. Simpson, Pension Funds of Multiemployer
Industrial Groups, Unions, and Nonprofit Organizations, Occasional Paper 105, New York,
NBER, 1968.
BWiesenbergerFinancial Services, Inc., Investment Companies: Mutual Funds and Other
Types, 1969 edition, p. 90.214 InstitutionalInvestors
simple. Changes in interest rates or stoák prices proved to be statistically
insignificant.
Yt




That short-run increases in income raise the share of income devoted to
pension reserves may be attributed to several factors. Periods of prosperity
extend the coverage of pension fund programs at a rate above the long-
term trend by employing the marginal work force. More liberal pension
agreements may be realized in times of prosperity and vice versa. Finally,
there is a growing percentage of workers whose benefits are based on
final compensation. This implies that short-run increases in income will
lead to a higher share of income devoted to pension funds in the short
run.
4. Lffe Insurance Reserves. Life insurance companies provide a guaranteed
fixed-dollar payment to their customers, with premiums based on rather
conservative investment assumptions. Life insurance was the first form of
nonbank financial intermediation serving a wide market. Coverage has
grown extensively throughout the twentieth century, so that, by 1965,
83 percent of all households had at least one member insured.9 Currently
•about 15 percent of insurance company assets are held to cover the liabili-
ties of insured pension funds. Historically, insured pension funds were
the predominant form of pension savings, but insured pension plans
have grown much less rapidly during the postwar period than uninsured
plans.
A very small share of life insurance reserves is accounted for by variable
annuity plans. Since 1963, some states have permitted life insurance
companies to establish so-called "separate accounts" in which they invest
pension reserves in equities. These are essentially equivalent to the
common. trust funds which commercial banks use to manage small
pension accounts collectively. To date most variable-annuity offerings
are oriented toward serving those who qualify under the Keough Act;
there. are few variable-annuity plans that are not sheltered.
The growth of life insurance reserves net of policy loans exhibits both
a trend and short-run variations. While the trend in fund flows is positive,
°Instituteof Life Insurance, LifeinsuranceFact Book, 1966, p.7.The Demand for Corporate Stock 215
theshare of income that households devote to life insurance has steadily
fallen.
(5) = 5.574—1.526 9.794 + 19.16 —.0349RS
t (2.80)(5.99) (1.86) t—1(1.98) (1.94)
R2 =.7469
D.W. =1.96
The cause for the downward trend in life insurance premiums as a
share of income, as represented by the negative coefficient for is the
growth of alternative forms of savings yielding higher returns—corporate
pension plans and mutual funds. Each yields higher returns by being more
heavily invested in corporate equities. In addition, pension savings are
tax free. It seems likely that life insurance contracts defined by current
premiums and fixed payment obligations will continue to receive a lesser
share of the consumer savings dollar. Insurance companies might enhance
their product by offering variable-annuity plans as an inflation hedge or
by reducing the premiums on straight life and term insurance, either
policy requiring that insurance companies become more active in the
equity market. Life insurance companies appear to have chosen another
alternative, that of entering the mutual fund business. In 1968 and 1969,
there was a large-scale merging and comingling of insurance companies
and mutual fund management and equity. By the third quarter of 1969,
153 mutual funds were linked to 79 insurance companies or groups;
$8 billion of mutual fund shares was involved—16 percent of the in-
dustry.'0 The economics of the mass marketing of both insurance and
mutual fund shares are obvious. It would appear that life insurance
premiums will continue to be based on fixed-income investments and that
the trends in household choices for fixed obligation insurance described in
equation (5) are likely to persist.
Short-term fluctuations in fund flows to life insurance have become
significant since the middle 1950's.. These variations are highly correlated
with changes in money markets; in particular, life insurance flows are
negatively correlated with short-run changes in interest rates. In each
period of tight credit and rising interest rates since 1957, life insurance
fund flows as a share of household income declined more than would be
10WiesenbergerFinancial Services, Inc., Mutual Affairs, November 1969, p. 104.216 InstitutionalInvestors
indicated by the long-run downward trend in the share of household
savings devoted to life insurance. There are several explanations. Life
insurance companies are committed to lending to policy holders at fixed
rates of interest; these lending terms inevitably become very attractive
when market interest rates rise sharply and credit rationing occurs. While
the 1966 credit crunch was the first in which this mechanism received
much public attention, the negative coefficient on the term for changes
in interest rates in equation (5) suggests that it has been operative and of
empirical significance for some time. An additional explanation for the
significance of the change-in-interest-rate variable is simply that rising
market rates of interest are attracting household savings into fixed-income
securities. This is discussed further below.
Stock prices also are significant in the equation, the negative coefficient
implying that rising (stock') prices attract funds from life insurance. In the
subsequent equations for household purchases of stock, stock prices appear
to influence stock purchases with a one-year lag. Thus, the exact relation-
ship between life insurance and net stock purchases, particularly the timing
of such switches in asset holdings, remains unclear.
5. "Fixed Interest" Long- Term Claims: Bonds and Mortgages. No trend is
evident in the share of income devoted to fixed-income securities, but
there are very considerable cyclical variations. Additions to bond holdings
are negatively correlated with short-run changes in income. The response
of fixed-income security holdings to short-run changes in interest rates is
very pronounced; households substitute bonds for savings deposits during
periods of tight credit. This substitution is made largely by upper-income
households. Holdings of marketable securities other than stock are more
concentrated among wealthy households than any other form of invest-
ment assets. In 1963, the top tenth of the income distribution held 45 per-
cent of total wealth, and 80 percent of total investment in marketable
securities other than stock." In recession years the actual share of income
devoted to fixed-income securities falls. The equation below suggests
that this negative income effect is more than offset by interest rate
effects.
Stock prices are also significant in the equation for bond holdings, and
are positively correlated when a one year lag is allowed. As will be seen
below, households react to stock prices after a lag, switching out of stocks
DorothyS. Projector and Gertrude S. Weiss, Survey of Financial Characteristics of
Consumers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1966, pp. 14—15.The Demand for Corporate Stock 217
after the stockmarket declines; the equation below suggests that some of





where F equals additions to holdings of fixed income securities, and
equals return on stock with a one year lag.
Data for 1969 have only recently become available. Extrapolation with
the above equationprovides an estimate of the impact of tight credit
during 1969. Based on the 22.5 percent increase in interest rates during
1969, equation (6) predicts that households will devote 1.7 percent of their
income to fixed-income securities, compared with a mean level of about
one-half of 1 percent during the postwar period. The actual percentage was
2.5 percent. The$23.1 billion invested in bonds was nearly double the
rate during the 1966 credit crunch; 1969 was clearly a year of extra-
ordinary participation in the bond markets by the household sector.


























(4.19) (F + SD + (5.71)(2.83)218 institutionalInvestors




Equations (7) and (8) reveal the shift into fixed-income securities as
interest rates rise in the short run. Equation (10) indicates that life
insurance reserves fall less rapidly than do savings deposits when credit
conditions are tightened and disintermediation occurs.
The sum of savings by fixed-income holdings, savings accounts, and life
insurance as a percent of income is increasing over time, the increase in
holdings of fixed-income securities and savings deposits having more than
offset the decline in life insurance savings. This trend is reflected in a
positive coefficient on interest rates in equations (11) and (12).








While changes in income also appear in these equations, the significant
autocorrelation reduces the statistical significance of the estimated co-
efficients. Conspicuous by its absence in these equations is the short-run
change in interest rates, which proves statistically insignificant.
This suggests that the reduced fund flows into life insurance and savings
deposits associated with increasing market interest rates in the short run
is essentially offset by higher flows into fixed-income holdings.
6. Corporate Stock and Mutual Fund Shares. Ownership of corporate stock
is not nearly as widespread throughout the income distribution as pensionThe Demand for Corporate Stock 219
funds,life insurance, or savings deposits. In 1963 one person in six held
stocks,12 and the wealthiest 10 percent of the population held 62 per-
cent of the equity in publicly traded stock.'3 A trend toward a more even
distribution of corporate stock ownership has prevailed throughout the
twentieth century. From 1952 to 1956 the median money income of stock-
holders actually declined from $7,100 to $6,200, or 15 percent; while for
the populace as a whole, median income rose by about that same percent-
age. However, since the early 1960's this trend has been altered due to
the growth in mutual funds. Mutual funds provide a relatively inexpensive
means for the small investor to diversify. As a result, direct investment in
corporate stock is being displaced by investment in mutual funds. Both.
the 1962 and 1965 Census of Stockholders revealed the same proportion of
the population holding corporate stock directly. During this three year
period, median household income of shareowners increased 16 percent,
the same increase as for median household income At the
same time, mutual fund growth has been rapid and ownership increas-
ingly widespread. Mutual funds had 9.1 million accounts by 1968 year-
end versus 300,000 in 1940.
Two other characteristics of mutual fund purchasers deserve mention.
In very recent years, the median family income of mutual fund holders
has accelerated, rising from $8,100 in 1963 to $11,350 in 1966, an increase
well in excess of the rise in income for the population generally. Also, the
average age of those in accumulation plans rose sharply, from 42.8 to
46.4 years. This suggests that mutual funds are becoming an increasingly
important means of providing retirement savings for middle- and upper-
income households.'5
Second, household acquisitions of mutual funds have shifted in favor of
those with greater risk. In 1958, the share of the investment in mutual
funds to be found in funds classified as "diversified common stock" was
60 percent; a decade later that figure had risen to 80 percent. "Balanced"
funds, with 20 to 50 percent of their assets invested in fixed dollar holdings,
saw their share of the mutual fund market decline from 26 to 14 percent.16
As will be seen below, mutual fund market performance approximated the
'2New York Stock Exchange, Fact Book, 1968, p. 40. The next survey was scheduled for
1.970. There is no evidence on how the distribution of dollar amounts of stock held, by
income class, is changing.
Projector and Weiss, op. cit., p. 15.
NYSE,Fact Book, 1968, p. 40.
15InvestmentCompany Institute, Mutual Fund Fact Book, 1969, p. 47.
16InvestmentCompanies: Mutual Funds and Other Types, pp. 42—44.220 InstitutionalInvestors
return achieved by the market averages until 1965. Since 1965, the per-
formance of the growth funds has improved substantially. By accepting
higher risk, the growth funds were able to earn a significantly higher
return, though it was accompanied by a higher variance. Whether house-
holds will continue to exhibit this preference for more risk remains to be
seen.
Household annual acquisitions of corporate stock (both direct holdings
and the sum of direct holdings and mutual fund shares) have turned from
a marginal plus to a rather large negative amount during the postwar
period. Households sold $12 billion in stocks (other than investment com-
pany shares) in 1968 and nearly $11 billion in 1969. One striking feature
about this series is that its magnitude is very small, a tiny fraction of
1 percent of either total personal income or the total valuation on stock
held. Moreover, it does not change much when stock prices change
dramatically. A sizable portion of stockholdings is very inactive. A 1965
survey indicated that only one-half of all household stockholders acquired
any stock that year, and that only one in eight made as many as five
transactions. The average income of the small share who were more active
in the market was very much higher than that for all shareholders
generally.17
There are several explanations for the downward trend in net acquisi-
tions. One is the long-run shift in relative prices in favor of fixed-income
holdings. Bond rates have risen over these two decades, while returns on
stock were lower in the 1960's than 1950's; for the period 1950—59 the
compound rate of growth (price appreciation plus dividends) for the Stan-
dard and Poor's index of 500 stocks was 20.3 percent, versus 10.9 percent
from 1958 to 1968.18 Another explanation is the rise in pensions as an
alternative means of savings. The declining share of income, or the share
of financial savings, devoted to direct stock investment and mutual fund
shares combined is represented by equation (13), revealing a negative






NYSE, PublicTransactions Survey, 1965.
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Thebond rate is essentially a trend proxy in this equation, reflecting
the several sources of change discussed above. Neither short-run changes in
interest rates or bond prices, nor a distributed lag or weighted average of
current and past stock prices, proved statistically significant in this
equation.
Disaggregation of direct and indirect stockholdings reveals more about
household investment behavior. Both strong trends and short-run varia-
tions are apparent in household acquisitions of mutual funds. The rate of
return in the stock market is correlated with net mutual fund sales (sales
less redemptions) after allowing for a lag. The sharp stock market declines
in 1962 and 1966 resulted in much lower mutual fund sales a year later.
The following equation was fitted.




Short-run changes in income or interest rates did not prove statistically
significant. The upward trend in mutual fund sales has been interrupted
only by sharp variations in stock prices.
Direct corporate stock acquisitions and sales present a different picture.
In addition to a downward trend, represented by a significant coefficient
on the bond rate, short-run changes in income and interest rates are also
statistically significant. Short-run increases in income coincide with a lower
share of income devoted to stock purchases. The positive coefficient on
changes in bond rates indicates that rate increases attract more money into
stocks. This is not easily explained. As noted, fixed-income securities also
attract funds during periods of rising interest rates. There have been
several periods when stock prices fell as interest rates moved up. However,
attempts to include stock prices in the equation, in either current or lagged
terms, or by a weighted average, proved unsuccessful. The explanation for
the positive correlation of net stock purchases with short-run changes in
the interest rate remains unclear.




Disaggregation of households' net stock purchases provides further
insight. Odd-lot transactions are made largely by the small investor,
primarily in the household sector. Net purchases of odd lots on the
NYSE amount to about one-fifth of the total household sector's net flows.
An equation for the ratio of odd-lot net purchases to income is
(16)
=7.555—.8987 —10.79 + 7.525 + .0220 RS -
g (4.98) (1.66) (2.30) (2.03)
R2 =.7035
D.W. =1.21
whereequals net odd-lot purchases on NYSE in year t. Stock prices
enter with a one-year lag, while current stock prices are not statistically
significant. Odd-lot purchases thus behave much like mutual fund net
purchases. Households appear to react in belated fashion to stock prices,
increasing their net selling of direct holdings and their redemption of
mutual funds afterstockprices decline. This is testimony to the familiar
cliche that "the odd-lotters are always wrong." The most recent illustra-
tion is their actions during the 1966—67 market decline and recovery.
Household mutual fund redemptions and net sales of direct stockholdings
were much higher than usual in 1967, following the sharp market drop in
1966. The stock market was staging a huge recovery in 1967. While annual
data is not suited to a determination of the precise timing of this phen-
omenon, the general outlines are clear.
The same equation for round lot net purchases (i.e., all household net
purchases less those in odd lots) is similar, but stock prices in this case do
not prove statistically significant.
(17) =54.65—4.8971RB —58.536 + 21.967
t(2.10)(8.85) (1.96) (2.68) t—i
R2=.9043
D.W. =2.34
The "household" sector in the flow of funds accounts is an agglomera-
tion of several types of accounts, including personal trusts and estates,
colleges and universities, and nonprofit foundations. At year-end 1968
colleges and nonprofit foundations held $25 billion in corporate stock,The Demand for Stock 223
whilepersonal trusts held $95 billion. Together this wasnearlyone-eighth
of the stock held by the "household" sector as defined in Flow of Funds
Accounts. Trusts and foundations are likely to behave differently than
households, but unfortunately no flow of funds data are available on their
actions. By making explicit assumptions about the annual price apprecia-'
tion of stockholdings by each group, the flow of money into or out of
corporate stocks can be estimated. Together with reported asset hold-
ings at the beginning and end of the year, estimates of flows of new funds
into stocks (or withdrawals) can be derived. That estimate will be only as
reliable as the assumptions about portfolio appreciation. It was assumed
'that portfolio appreciation for personal trusts, colleges, and foundations
equaled the rate of price appreciation plus dividends for the Dow-Jones
industrial, average (DJIA). While this assumption is a reasonable approxi-
mation over the long run, the estimates for any given year are subject to
some error. The error is probably largest when stock price changes are
largest. Excluding estimated "fund flows" of personal trusts, colleges, and
foundations from round lot net purchases, the relationship is




whereequals net purchases by "household" sectorless odd-lots on the
NYSE, and less estimated net purchases by personal trusts and estates,
colleges and universities, and foundations. The significance of the stock
price term is by no means unambiguous, since it may reflect misspeciflca-
tion in the net fund flows by personal trusts and estates.
Estimated net purchases by personal trusts and estates as a share of
income reveal neither trend nor short-run responsiveness to income or






where PTequals net purchases of stocks by personal trusts and estates. The
coefficient on stock prices is subject to two different interpretations: stock
price declines may attract funds of personal trusts into stocks or their past
holdings of stocks may fluctuate less in value than the DJIA, the assump-
tion used to derive net flows.
7. Summary. Short-run increases in income raise the share of income
devoted to financial savings in the aggregate, indicating that the short-run
marginal propensity to consume is below its long-run level. Higher interest
rates in the short run also induce households to devote a higher share of
income to financial savings and to shift from life insurance and savings
deposits into direct bond holdings.
Over the long run households are reducing their direct participation in
the equities markets, while at the same time increasing their indirect
holdings, by investing in mutual funds and uninsured pension funds.
Currently, the increase in pension fund holdings and mutual fund shares
more than offsets the decline in household sales of stock. The short-run
variations in stock prices affect household investment decisions; stock
market declines hasten the liquidation of households' direct stockholdings
and reduce their willingness to buy mutual funds, in each case the reaction
occurring after a time lapse.
3.THESTOCK INVESTMENT POLICIES OF THE MANY TYPES OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
An overview of the trends in the holdings and net purchases and sales of
corporate stock by financial institutions in the postwar period was given
in section 5 of Chapter 3. Also in that section was a summary of the
relationship of these holdings and transactions to total acquisition of
financial assets by financial institutions, to total net issues of corporate
stock, to total volume of trading in corporate stock on exchanges in the
U.S., and to the velocity of turnover of the stock portfolio of financial
institutions. The present section reviews, still very summarily, the policies
followed by the main types of financial institutions and their relation to
other uses of their funds, employing a standard table (e.g., Table 5-2), and
summarizes the scarce available information on the structure of the stock
portfolios of these institutions.19
19Itis expected that these matters will be analyzed in the Commission's own report in
much greater detail for the last four years on the basis of new primary data specifically
collected for this purpose.The Demand for Corporate Stock .225
TABLE5-2













Distribution of financial assets
1. Cash 3.8 2.2 1.3 1.2 1.7
2. U.S. govt. securities 26.915.8 7.1 4,6 3.2
3. State and local govt. securities — — — —
4. Mortgages 1.3 1.6 3.4 4.5 4.1
5. Loans — — — — —
6. Corporate bonds 45.143.241.231.327.5
7. Corporate stocks 17.833.343.354.759.0
8. Miscellaneous assets 5.1 3.8 3.7 3.3 4.5
Total ($billion) 7.8 18.3 38.1 72.696.6
Distribution of net acquisition of financial assetsa .
1. Cash 2.4 0.6 1.3 2.4
2. U.S. govt. securities 10.8— 1.9 3.5— 1.2
3. State and local govt. securities — — — —
4. Mortgages 1.2 5.6 8.7 2.7
5.Loans — — — —
6. Corporate bonds 53.048.430.3 15.7
7. Corporate stocks 28.943.551.973.7
8. Miscellaneous assets 3.6 3.8 4.3 6.7
Total ($billion) 8.3 16.123.125.5
Flow of Funds Accounts 1945—1968 and ibid., First Quarter, 1970.
aPeriodending with year indicated at top of column, derived from annual figures.
Hence, occasional small differences may appear when compared with final differences
between benchmark years.226 InstitutionalInvestors
a. Uninsured Pension Funds
Net fund flows into pension funds are growing rapidly, arc unusually
stable, and can be easily predicted on an actuarial basis, given assumptions
about employee contributions, rates of retirement, and benefit payments.
Pension funds do not face a liquidity problem arising from sudden changes
in fund flows.
Originally, the investment objective of pension funds was that of achiev-
ing a return to meet a dollar target payment at some future date. Until
about 1950, private pension funds were about equally divided between
insured and uninsured plans. Insured pension funds were very conserva-
tively invested, life insurance companies being severely limited in their
opportunity to acquire corporate stock.
In the decade following World War II, corporate treasurers gradually
adopted the investment strategy of maximizing returns subject to a risk
limitation, rather than that of investing to minimize the risk associated
with. meeting a specified target based on particular conservative actuarial
assumptions. In the years immediately following the war, the interest
rates on long-term government bonds (pegged atpercent) kept interest
rates on private bonds at similar low levels. The higher returns on common
stock investments were strong inducement for bank trustees to invest an
increasing share in stocks. Accordingly, uninsured pension funds quickly
sold off the government securities which they had accumulated during
World War II and invested primarily in corporate stoclth and bonds, a
process that can be followed in Table 5-2. This change was made possible
by a 'revision in the New York State law allowing trustees to invest up to
35 percent of a fund in stocks.2° The largest companies with established
records were the obvious investment vehicle. A steadily rising trend is
exhibited in the share of fund flows invested in corporate stock throughout
the postwar period.
There is no statistical correlation between changes in the portfolio
composition of pension funds shown in Table 5-2 and changes iii rates of
return on stocks or bonds. An important qualification must be made in
interpreting this result. Aggregated data for all pension funds-may conceal
relationships that exist at the individual-firm level. If fund managers have
different bases for forming price or interest rate expectations or if they
respond at varying speeds to change in relative rates of return, aggregated
data on portfolio composition will reflect the sum of these behavioral
effects. For example, the gradual shift to stocks appearing in the aggregate
20Murray,cii., pp. 72—80.The Demand for Corporate Stock 227
datamay reflect a series of decisions, each made at a fairly discrete point
in time by one of the various corporate treasurers (and their bank trust
department advisers), that their funds should be more heavily invested in
corporate stock. Many pension funds adopt a fixed percentage of fund
flows as their target for corporate stock investment, which they do not
change for many years. If the decisions by individual firms to change that
target occur at different points through the sample period (for example, in
response to changes in expected rates of return on stocks versus bonds, each
fund employing very different lags in forming those expectations),
aggregated data on portfolio composition may be trend dominated even
though relative prices on stocks and bonds are important to the decision.
While aggregation in the data may conceal the role of relative prices in
decisions regarding portfolio composition, it is likely that the real effects
of changing interest rates or stock yields in portfolio decisions are not
great. The predominant focus in most trust agreements is on long-term
growth. As will be noted in section 4, bank trustees have tended to invest
conservatively, essentially placing stock funds in medium and large
companies with long-term growth potential. Turnover rates on pension
funds are wçll below those of mutual funds (see Table 5-3). Short-run
variations in business conditions and interest rates apparently have little
effect on decisions regarding the share of portfolios devoted to stocks. In
addition, trust departments manage a huge volume of assets, with large
new fund flows. This makes it more difficult to pursue an aggressive invest-
ment policy which is responsive to short-run changes in bond and equity
markets.
The future course of pension fund investment has been the subject of
considerable speculation. The direction of future fund flows will reflect
rates of return on alternative credit instruments. A recent suggestion that
the flow of funds into corporate stock might stabilize or peak at about 60
percent, and similarly the suggestion that pension funds would increase
their involvement in mortgages, are contradicted by the 1967—68 experi-
ence.21 Corporate stock accounted for approximately 85 percent of fund
flows in 1967 and 1968 and for 75 percent in 1969.
A limited number of pension accounts have adopted a riskier market
strategy since 1967. Aggregate turnover rates for pension funds have in-
creased significantly since that date. Some pension accounts have been
switched from bank trust departments or self-management to private
investment advisers or brokers managing special equity funds. These
managers are generally offering a level of expected yield and associated
Ibid.,pp.92—97.228 InstitutionalInvestors
TABLE 5-3













Distribution of financial assets
1. Cash 1.8 1.9 1.0 0.9 0.9
2. U.S. govt.securities 51.843.930.323.6 15.5
3. State and local govt. securities 30.425.222.6 7.9 4.3
4. Mortgages 1.8 2.8 7.7 11.2 11.4
5.Loans — —
6. Corporate bonds 12.523.434.449.454.3
7. Corporate stocks — 0.9 2.1 4.811.4
8. Miscellaneous assets 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2
Total ($billion) 5.6 10.7 19.533.051.0
Distribution of net acquisition of financial
1. Cash 1.1
2. U.S. govt. securities 36.713.6 14.7 0.6
3. Stateandlocalgovt.securities 20.4 19.3—13.2— 2.2
4. Mortgages 4.1 13.616.9 11.7
5.Loans — — — —
6. Corporate bonds 36.7 48.9 69.9 62.8
7. Corporate stocks — 4.5 9.6 23.9
8. Miscellaneous assets -2.0— 2.2 2.2
Total ($billion) 4.9 8.8 13.618.0
SOURCES: Same as Table 5-2.
Period ending with year indicated at top of column, derived from annual figures.
Hence, occasional small differences may appear when compared with final differences
between benchmark years.The Demand for Corporate Stock 229
riskthat lies between the traditional conservative bank trust department
philosophy and the high risk strategy represented by the smaller "per-
formance"-oriented mutual funds. Bank trust departments have also
responded in a limited way to their treasurers' interest in assuming more
risk, by creating pooled equity funds within the bank that are oriented
toward a higher turnover, high "performance" objective. A modest share
of individual pension accounts are invested in such accounts, at the dis-
cretion of the corporate treasurer (often limited to 10 percent). In one
instance, such a pooled equity fund constituted $800 million of the bank's
total trust assets of $12 billion.22 How much risk corporate treasurers will
assume in managing their pension funds in the future is difficult to predict.
b. State and Local Retirement Funds
The characteristics of fund flows and investment objectives of state and
local retirement funds are not unlike those of private pension funds.
However, up until now political factors have resulted in a rather conserva-
tive investment strategy—a large share of funds invested in public
securities and a very small share in corporate stock (Table 5-3). Public
retirement funds have generally been managed by state or municipal
treasurers. Funds have been gradually shifted from U.S. government and
state and local securities into corporate bonds and, more recently, into
mortgages. The share invested in stock has been quite small, less than
5 percent of new funds up until the middle 1960's. Throughout this period
the performance on such portfolios has been disappointingly low.23 A
weak negative correlation exists between changes in interest rates and the
share of funds devoted to corporate stock. For the period 1948—68, the
share of funds devoted to stock by state and local retirement funds can be
represented as follows:
(20) —= .1728+ .0042(t) —.1651
\, (1.52)(3.34) (1.48) t—i
R2=.3955
1.86
where S is net stock purchases, TA is the change in total assets, and RB is
22Robert L. Donerstein, "Bankers Trustmari Furnum Has Most of the Answers,"
Finance, February 1970, pp.10—15.
23Murray,op. cii., pp. 102—10.230 InstitutionalInvestors
the interest rate on three- to five-year government bonds. Stock prices
were not statistically significant in the equation.
The investment policies of public retirement programs appear to be
changing rather dramatically in very recent years. Since 1967, the share
of funds devoted to corporate stock has been rising rapidly; in 1967 and
1968, 15 to 20 percent of net fund flows were allocated to corporate stock
versus less than 5 percent in earlier years. While the process of liberalizing
legal restrictions and political constraints on the investment of such funds
is likely to progress in an uncertain fashion, there appears to be a potential
for a further dramatic shift to corporate equities. In 1969, Oregon pion-
eered a new approach, that of allowing outside professional managers to
handle a portion of equity funds with full discretion. Other states appear
headed in the same direction.24 It seems likely that state and local govern-
ment retirement funds will devote a much larger share of their funds to
corporate stocks, as corporate pension funds have already done.
c. LifeInsuranceCompanies
Historically, life insurance companies have been very conservative
investors, on the presumption that their fundamental objective should be
safety of principal. As a result over three-fourths of all life insurance assets
have been invested in corporate bonds and mortgages (Tables 5-3 and
5-4). A variety of statutory and institutional considerations reduced the
investment alternatives in corporate stock that were available to life
insurance companies; state laws provide very strict limitations.25 Most
life insurance company assets are held by companies licensed in New York.
Originally, New York State law prohibited investment in corporate stock.
Relaxation of this restriction in 1951 allowed life insurance companies to
invest up to 3 percent of total assets in common stock; an amendment in
1957 raised the limit to 5 percent. The law also prescribes limits on the
type of company whose stock is eligible. A company must have paid a
dividend in each of the previous ten years, and dividends must not have
exceeded earnings in any year. Obviously, these restrictions severely limit
the choice of stocks open to life insurance companies.
The extent to which statutory limitations have reduced the share of fund
flows that life insurance companies have devoted to equities is the subject
of some dispute. Brimmer noted that in 1951 when the first significant
"Oregon Blazes the Pension Trail," Institutional Investor, February 1970, pp. 41—47.
25Fora review of state laws and their see Commission on Money and Credit,
Life Insurance Gompanies as Financial Institutions, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.., Prentice-Hall, 1962,
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TABLE5-4













Distribution of financial assets
1. Cash 1.6 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.8
2. U.S. govt. securities 16.5 9.8 5.6 3.3 2.1
3. State and local govt. securities 1.8 2.3 3.1 2.3 1.7
4. Mortgages 28.933.641.639.737.9
5. Loans 3.9 3.9 4.3 5.9 7.8
6. Corporate bonds 41.242.136.139.038.5
7. Corporate stocks 3.3 4.1 4.7 5.2 6.9
8. Miscellaneous assets 2.7 2.8 3.4 3.7 .4.2
Total ($billion) 66.787.9115.8154.0190.0
Distribution..of net acquisition of financial
1. Cash 1.0— 0.5—
2. U.S. govt. securities —12.1—8.1—3.8—3.6
3. Stateandlocalgovt.securities 4.8 5.5—0.3—0.8
4. Mortgages 48.845.250.033.8
5. Loans 3.9 8.1. 7.1 19.0
6. Corporate bonds 46.941.235233.2
7. Corporate stocks 3.4 2.6 6.312.3
8. Miscellaneous assets 3.4 5.5 4.9 6.1
Total ($billion) 20.727.236.635.8
Same as Table 5-2.
Period ending with year indicated at top of column, derived from annual figures.
Hence, occasional small differences may appear when compared with final differences
between benchmark years.232 InstitutionalInvestors
liberalization in the New York State law occurred, life insurance com-
panies invested 40 percent less in stocks than in the year before.26 A survey
of the industry in 1959 revealed that an overwhelming majority opposed
substitution of the prudent-man rule in place of statutory limitations.
However, more than half the industry wanted the New York State law
liberalized to allow.lO percent of a portfolio to be invested in stocks.27 In
general, the investment policy of life insurance companies through 1965
was quite conservative.28 Annual acquisitions of common and preferred
stock since 1958 are shown in Tables 5-5 and 5-6.
The rules for valuation of assets constitute the second major deterrent
to stock investment by life insurance companies. Most life insurance
companies are mutual companies and are required by law to return profits
in excess of a stated level of net policy liabilities. Thus, determining asset
values critically affects a company's cash flow and almost since its be-
ginning has been the subject of dispute in the industry.29 Valuation of
stocks is required to be at market value, though in 1957 some modification
was made for preferred stocks. This in turn is the basis for determining the
reserves from which dividend payments are made. "Overvaluation" of
assets due to temporary price increases leads to higher dividend payments,
while "undervaluation," by using temporarily depressed security prices,
produces huge paper losses. In actual practice, valuation rules are often
changed and often suspended when large changes occur in securities
prices. Frame's study of the effect of valuation policy and practices
suggests that the industry's valuation procedures may have reduced real
solvency.30 For present purposes, the most significant consequence is that
the rules have discouraged investment in securities with above average risk,
in both common and preferred stock.31 The disincentives to investment in
preferred stock have cost the industry a substantial amount, since their
return in the long run has been well above corporate bonds.32 The
28AndrewBrimmer, Insurance Companies in the Capital Markets, E. Lansing,Mkhigan
State University Press, 1962, pp. 340—41.
27Ibid.,pp. 347—57.
28R.Hart, "Life Insurance Companies and the Equity Capital Market," Journal of
Finance, 1965, pp. 362—67.
29Fora good historical review, see Insurance Companies as Financial Institutions
(note 25, above), pp. 166—73.
Harold0. Frame, Valuation of Security Holdings ofLjfe Insurance Companies, Homewood,
II)., Richard D. Irwin, 1962, pp. 20—21.
31LawrenceD. Jones, Investment Policies of Life Insurance Companies, Boston, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1968, pp. 143-45.
32AldenC. Olson, The Impact qf Valuation Requirements on the Preferred Stock Investment
Policies of Lzfe Insurance Companies, Occasional Paper No. 13, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Michigan State University, 1964.The Demand for Corporate Stock 233
TABLE5-5





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1958 0.37 .09 .07 0.28 .06
•1959 0.51 .15 .10 0.36 .06
1960 0.66 .25 .21 0.41 .07
1961 0.92 .31 .21 0.61 .10
1962 0.77 .22 .12 0.55 .07
1963 0.79 .26 .16 0.53 .08
1964 . 1.07 .32 .23 0.75 .09
1965 1.46 .48 .31 0.98 .13
1966 1.32 .22 .12 1.10 .14
1967 2.07 .38 .21 1.69 .20
1968 3.32 .39 .18 1.93 .24
SouRcE: Institute of Life Insurance, LifeInsuranceFact Book, 1969, p. 81.
a Includes very small amounts of railroad stock (for 1958—68, $35 million of preferred
and 882 million of common).
opportunity cost of remaining largely out of the equity market in
common stocks is even greater.
d. Non-Life-Insurance Companies
The growth of fire and casualty insurance companies has been much
more sporadic than that of life insurance companies, and short-run
changes in fund flows tend to be substantial. From 1946 through 1965,
net fund flows fluctuated from $600 million to $1,800 million yearly, with
little evidence of trend or business cycle effects. Since 1966, growth has
been much more rapid. In both 1966 and 1967, fund inflows exceeded
$2 billion, and in 1968 they were over $3 billion.
Instability in fund flows has induced non-life-insurance companies to
invest significant amounts in government securities, which serve largely
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TABLE5-7













Distribution of financial assets
1. Cash 8.7 6.2 4.6 3.3 2.8
2. U.S. govt. securities 39.9 28.9 19.9 15.2 8.4
3. State and local govt. securities 10.1 19.928.828.582.3
4. Mortgages 0.7 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.4
5. Corporate bonds 5.8 5.7 6.0 7.613.3
6. Corporate stocks 28.332.733.538.635.1
7. Miscellaneous assets 6.5 5.7 6.8 6.7 7.6
Total ($billion) 13.821.128.139.649.8
Distribution of net acquisition of financial assetsa
1. Cash 2.0— — 0.9
2. U.S. govt. securities 12.2—7.0 4.6—17.8
3. State and local govt. securities 55.168.450.843.9
4. Mortgages — — — —











Total ($billion) 4.9 5.7 6.510.7
SouRcEs; Same as Table 5-2.
aPeriodending with year indicated at top of column, derived from annual figures.
occasional small differences may appear when compared with final differences
between benchmark years.
government security holdings mainly reflects variation in claims (cf.
Table 5-7). As with other financial institutions, government securities
made up a large share of their assets after World War II. These were sold
in the postwar period. Government securities have now been reduced to
about one-tenth of the asset holdings of nonlife insurance companies.236 InstitutionalInvestors
Nonlife company investment portfolios exhibit several distinct trends
and tradeoffs. First, a large share of funds is invested in state and local
securities; unlike pension funds, nonlife companies are subject to corporate
income tax and hence the tax-free status of municipal securities has proven
attractive. However, their share in total funds has fallen over time while
investments in corporate bonds and mortgages have risen, even though
the after-tax yield on state and local government securities has been con-
siderably higher. Relative rates of return are not statistically significant
in explaining this tradeoff, nor are short-run changes in interest rates.
However, during periods of declining fund flows the share of funds
devoted to bonds falls, while conversely an increasing share is devoted to
state and local securities. The following equations using annual data for
the postwar period illustrate these tradeoffs. Net fund flows were defined
exclusive of variation in government security holdings, which approxi-







(22) =.1120+ .0797 + .1874
(A —
(TA— (2.29)(2.08) (2.22)(TA —
R2=.4065
D.W. =1.82
where B equals net purchases of bonds, SLG equals net purchases of state
and local government securities, and TA —Gequals the change in total
assets less government securities.
Finally, there is no statistical explanation for the share of funds devoted
to stocks. Neither fund flows, relative rates of return, or short-run changes
in the capital markets appear relevant. The most noticeable occurrence
is the rise in the share of funds devoted to corporate stock since 1967.
This may be the result of a change in investment strategy or it may simply
reflect the more than doubling of net fund flows over this two-year period.The Demand for Corporate Stock 237
e.Mutual Funds33
Investment strategy varies among different types of mutual funds,
though only those most interested in safety of principal or income hold any
appreciable part of their funds outside of stocks. In the aggregate, the
industry invests 85 percent of fund flows in corporate stock. The industry's
"portfolio response" to changes in interest rates or stock prices in the
aggregate is to alter marginally (by a few percent) its cash holdings.
The most significant change in investment strategy by mutual funds
occurred very recently. Many funds have increased the risk they are
willing to take, placing greater emphasis on short-run performance. A
much larger share of assets has been invested in smaller companies and
unlisted securities. Also, turnover rates have increased sharply, from their
long-run norm of about 20 percent through 1965 to levels twice that high
in 1968 (Table 5-8). A recent survey indicated that the funds expect their
turnover rates to remain at these high levels in 1 These changes are
discussed below.
An adequate analysis of the portfolio structure of investment companies
and changes in portfolios for the entire postwar period would have gone
far beyond the scope of this study. Moreover, such a study has been made
for limited periods in the 1950's (the Wharton Study), and another, for
recent years, is now being undertaken in the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Institutional Investor Study. It may therefore suffice to
indicate in Table 5-9 the industrial breakdown of stockholdings of open-
end investment companies at a few benchmark dates between 1952 and
1968 and to compare it with a similar breakdown of all common stocks
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The comparison will indicate the
industrial sectors favored or neglected by open-end investment companies.
Thus, for instance, mutual funds have always held a considerably smaller
proportion of their portfolio in stocks of public utilities, railroads, auto-
mobiles, and chemicals than would correspond to those industries' share
in NYSE listings or total stock outstanding.25 On the other hand, mutual
Investment Company Institute, Managemeni Investment Companies, Englewood Cliffs,
N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1962; University of Pennsylvania, Wharton School of Finance and
Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, House Report No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2nd sess.,
Philadelphia, 1962; Securities and Exchange Commission, Public Policy Implications of
Investment Company Growth, House Report No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., Washington,
D.C., 1966.
Daniel Nordby and George DeVoe, "Secret Sales Tools for Researching Tomorrow's
Institutional Buyer," Finanee, December 1969, p. 26.
apparentlyhigh share of stock of financial companies in mutual fund portfolios
reflects of course the fact that only relatively few companies in this sector are listed on
the NYSE.238 InstitutionalInvestors
TABLE 5-8













Distribution of financial assets
1. Casha 2.921.5 2.4 1.8 6.0
2. U.S. govt. securities 2.9 3.8 3.5 3.0 1.2
3. Corporate bonds 8.8 6.3 7.1 7.8 7.0
4. Corporate stocks 85.487.487.087.485.8
Total ($billion) 3.4 7.917.027.152.6
Distribution of net acquisition of financial assetsb
1. Casha 4.8 3.7 10.231.2
2. U.s. govt. securities 9.5 5.6 2.0-—2.8
3. Corporate bonds 9.513.018.412.8
4. Corporate stocks 76.277.769.458.8
Total ($billion) 2.1 5.4 4.910.9
Same as Table 5-2.
aIncludesopen market paper,
bPeriodending with year indicated at top of column.
funds have invested more heavily in electronic,36 drug, and building
material companies than would correspond to the relative supply of
shares of this type.
f. Personal Trusts and Common Trusts
Systematic data on the investment portfolios of personal and common
trusts are unfortunately unavailable. Common trust funds were initiated
The comparison should be made for the sum of lines 1 and 2 in Table 5-9 because of
apparent differences in industrial classification of identical companies (probably including



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7The Demand for Corporate Stock 241
inthe 1930's as a means by which banks could exercise fiduciary responsi-
bility for small trusts at low cost. After the passage of the Keough Act in
1962, common trust fund assets grew from $3.6 billion in 1962 to $9.5
billion in Generally a conservative investment strategy has been
followed. Turnover rates have historically been well below those for other
institutional investors. During the 1960—64 period, one study showed that
over half of the equity common trust funds surveyed had turnovers ranging
from 3 to 9 percent.38 During this period only half of the funds outper-
formed the DJIA and only one-fourth exceeded the S&P 500 index.39
More recent studies for the period 1961—68 indicate that common trust
investment performance has been comparable to that of the S&P 500.40
During this period a gradual evolution toward investing a higher percent-
age of funds in corporate stock occurred, as is evident in Table 5-10.
Compared to other institutional investors, common trust funds have kept
a relatively large part of their stock portfolio in conservative preferred
and utility stocks (see Table 5-1 1).
Much less is known about the investment decisions of personal trusts.
The share of total assets held in stock has risen over th postwar period,
from 48 percent in 1951 to 70 percent in 1968 (see Table 5-12). As noted
earlier, fund flows can only be derived from reported changes in asset
holdings at year end and, hence, investment decisions regarding new
commitments cannotaccurately determined. It appears that trustees
have pursued very conservative policies. One survey indicated that turn-
over rates on private trusts during the week of October 21—25, 1963, were
2.5 percent, a level well below that of pension accounts.41
g. Commercial Ban/cs and ThrjJi Institutions
Commercial banks and savings and loan associations are prohibited by
law from holding corporate stock. Mutual savings banks are permitted
to hold stock, but up until now have chosen to make little commitment
in this area. Even in 1968, stocks represented less than 3 percent of their
Edwin W. Hanczaryk, Bank Trusts: Investments and Performance, Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, 1970, P. 34.
Frank L. Voorheir, "Bank Administered Pooled Equity Funds for Employee Benefit
Plans," Graduate School of Business Administration, Michigan State University, 1967,
p. 53.
3916id., pp. 60—72.
EdwardGill, "Equity Common Trust Funds," TrustsandEstates, February 1969,
pp. 109—200; Hanczaryk,cit., pp. 52—56.
NYSE,Institutional Shareownership, 1965, p. 41.242 InstitutionalInvestors
TABLE 5-10












Distribution of financial assets
1. Cash — 0.608 1.0 1.3
2. U.S. govt. securities 30.2 17.2 7.9 9.2 5.2
3. State and local govt.
4. Mortgages 75.6













6. Corporatestockpreferred 12.5 11.5 7.6 2.9 2.6
7. Corporate stock common 40.148.751.744.247.7
8. Other assets 1.6— — 0.2 0.6
Total ($billion) 1.1 1.8 2.8 7.5 9.5
Distribution of net acquisition of financial assetsa
1. Cash
2. U.s. govt. securitiesj
3. State and local govt. securities)
4. Mortgages


















6. Corporate stock preferred 39.9—5.0 2.8 5.4
7. Corporate stock common —188.880.3 11.239.2
8. Other assets —3.5 13.330.1 9.6
Total (percent) 100.0100.0100.0100.0
SOURCES: 1952: R. W. Goldsmith, Financial Intermediaries in the American Economy Since
1900, Princeton, Princeton University Press for National Bureau, 1958; 1955—68:
ibid., Appendix I.
Period ending with year indicated at top of column.
assets although net stock purchases in 1967—68 accounted for 5 percent
of total fund uses (Table 5-13). Stock porifolios are concentrated on
preferred shares and common stocks of banks and an investment company
jointly owned by a number of savings banks (Table 5-14). It seems un-
likelythat banks will become active participantsinthe equities
market.The Demand for C.rporate Stock 243
TABLE5-11






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1952 24.1 75.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1953 22.9 77.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1954 20.2 79.8 9.2 16.8 53.7
1955 19.1 80.9 8.3 16.8 55.8
1956 17.5 82.5 7.6 16.9 58.0
1957 17.9 82.1 7.8 18.2 56.1
1958 14.6 85.4 8.4 19.0 58.0
1959 12.8 87.2 8.4 18.5 60.4
1960 12.8 87.2 8.6 21.3 57.3
1961 10.4 89.6 10.6 21.9 57.1
1962 12.0 88.0 10.0 22.8 55.1
1963 9.0 91.0 9.2 21.4 60.4
1964 7.3 92.7 8.3 20.9 63.5
1965 6.2 93.8 7.6 18.9 673
1966 5.4 94.6 8.1 19.2 67.3
1967 4.7 95.3 7.1 15.0 73.1
1968 5.2 4.8 3.0 14.3 72.6
n.a.not available.
SotmcEs: 1951—53: R. W. Goldsmith, R. E. Lipsey, and M, Mendelson, Studies in
the National Balance Sheet of the United States, Princeton, Princeton University Press for
NBER, 1963, Vol. II, p. 123; 1954-62: Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues; 1963—68:
Edwin W. Hanczaryk, National Banking Review, 1965, p. 365, and ibid., 1967, p. 442.
ii. Summary
The shift of institutions into stocks over the postwar period does not lend
itself to any complex econometric explanation. Rates of return on equity
have been much above bond rates throughout the period. The shift to
stocks appears a belated and long process of adaptation to these circum-
stances.244 InstitutionalInvestors
TABLE 5-12
Structure of Assets and Transactions of Personal Trust Funds












Distribution of financial assets
1. Cash 2.2 2.4 1.0 1.0 1.0
2. U.S. govt.securities 23.8 12.2 5.9 7.2 5.7
3. State and local govt. securities 12.2 12.9 14.2 9.7 9.7
4. Mortgages 2.7 2.1 1.4 1.2 1.5
5. Corporate bonds 5.5 5.2 5.7 6.3
6. Corporate stock preferred 4.2 3.5 2.2 1.7 1.9
7. Corporate stock common 44.556.865.367.567.5
8. Other assets 6.6 4.6 4.8 6.6 6.4
Total ($billion) 39.1 55.0 71.9115.0138.4
Distribution of net acquisition of financial assets b
1. Cash 3.5 0.0 1.7 3.3
2. U.S. govt. securities —3.4—16.3 12.7—13.4
3. State and local govt. securities 10.3 2.129.129.6
4. Mortgages 6.5 4.0 3.7 3.3
5. Corporate bonds 59.374.029.027.2
6. Corporatestockpreferred 24.5—02 0.1 2.0
7. Corporate stock common 4.936.422.846.0
8. Other assets —5.6—0.0 0.8 1.8
Total (percent) 100.0100.0100.0100.0
SOURCE: Appendix I.
aIncludescommon trust funds; separate figures for these are shown in Table 5-11.
bPeriodending with year indicated at top of column.The Demand for Corporate Stock
TABLE 5-13
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Flow of Funds Accounts, 1945—1968. Ibid., First Quarter, 1970.
Period ending with year indicated at top of column, derived from annual figures.
Hence, occasional small differences may appear when compared with final differences
between benchmark years.
1951 1955 1960 1965 1969
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distribution of financial assets
1. Cash
2. U.S. govt. securities
3. State and local govt. securities
4.
5.
3.8 2.9 2.0 1.7 1.2
42.127.5 16.5 10.7 6.3
0.4 1.9 1.7 0.5 0.3
42.155.966.776.975.3
0.9 0.6 1.0 1.4 2.6
9.4 8.3 9.4 5.0 9.3
0.9 2.2 2.0 2.4 3.1
0.4 0.6 0.7 1.4 2.0
23.531.340.558.174.4
Distribution of net acquisition of financial
1. Cash
2. U.S. govt. securities








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4. THE RETURNONEQUITY AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT
SINCE 1967
Thesharp shift to stock by all major institutional investors in 1967 and
1968 occurred at a time when returns on equity were less attractive relative
to bonds than at any other time throughout the postwar period. Institu-
tions appear to have changed their expectations regarding the future
return on equity investment in response to the high return earned by a
TABLE 5-15




















1965 14.2 12.3 9.5 39.5 30.1
1966 —15.6 —10.0 —12.6 —6.6 —1.5
1967 18.9 23.7 23.1 76.5 54.0
1968 7.4 11.1 9.7 33.2 20.8
1969 —15.2 —11.4 —12.5 —19.7
SOURCE: New York Stock Exchange, Fact Book.
a35industrials (National Quotation Bureau).The Demand for Corporate Stock 249
segmentof the mutual fund industry. "Growth funds" have increased the
proportion of their asset holdings in medium-sized and smaller companies
and have assumed more risk, a strategy contrasting sharply with tradi-
tional practice, e.g., the policy of most bank trust departments. The
publicity about growth funds' "performance" and their approach to
investment since 1967 apparently induced some pension and other trusteed
accounts to assume more risk, and inflated expectations regarding the
return on equity for all types of institutional investors.
a. The Return on Equity
Several indices which measure the return (price appreciation plus
dividends) on different groups of equity investments are shown in Table
5-15. Dividend yields have been falling relative to capital gains throughout
the postwar period. Rising tax rates, the provision for lower capital gains
taxation, and the advantages to corporations of internal financing seem
to be the principal reasons for this change.
The explanations for the trends in stock prices and much of their
short-run fluctuation lie in fundamental economic factors, which affect
the expectations of all actual and potential corporate stockholders. The
level of stock prices responds in turn to these changes in expectations.
Price-earnings ratios are the best single measure of investors' expectations
concerning the further return on equity investments. A doubling of price-
earnings ratios occurred from the end of World War II to their peak in
1961 (see Table 5-16). The upward revision in these ratios during the
1950's suggests the increasing belief of investors that equity investments
were undervalued relative to bonds in that decade. This increase in
multiples accounted for over half of' the growth in stock prices during this
period (their annual rate of increase was about 20 percent). Since 1961,
multiples have fluctuated in the 13—20 range. The 10 percent annual rate
of increase in stock prices from 1960 through 1968 essentially mirrors the
growth in after-tax corporate profits.
In addition to these changing trends, the composition of returns
among companies has changed. While the indices of stock prices are
highly correlated, the more broadly based averages, the Standard and
Poor's 500 index or the New York Stock Exchange index of all stocks on
the Exchange, have a higher long-term growth rate than the Dow-Jones
industrial average, which is made up of thirty of the larger, more estab-
lished companies. From 1950 through 1959 the compound rate of growth



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Poor's 500 index. From 1959 through 1968, the rates of increase were 9.2
percent and 10.9 percent respectively. From 1967 through 1969 the
differences between these two indices became even more pronounced,
about 4 percent annually. The indices of American Stock Exchange stocks
and of industrial stocks traded over the counter (Table 5-15), which are
based primarily on the shares of smaller, younger companies, also illus-
trate this growing differential between large and small companies. From
1965 through 1968 the American Stock Exchange index rose 120 percent,
and over-the-counter stocks rose 83 percent, against 24 percent for the.
S&P index.
The basis for this ever increasing gap between the DJIA and the
broader-based averages reflects a long-run shift in the pattern of economic
growth. A systematic examination of growth by corporations in the
United States economy would go well beyond the scope of this study.
However, a brief review of the experience of the Fortune 500 indicates that
the smaller companies are growing the fastest. (The Fortune 500 are the
500 largest manufacturing firms, comprising 63.7 percent of all manufac-
turing sales in 1969. Statistics for the "Second 500" largest firms, first
compiled by Fortune for 1969, revealed that this group accounted for
6.5 percent of sales.) The 50 largest manufacturing firms in the Fortune
500 have sustained a slower growth rate since the beginning of the
economic expansion in 196 1,42 through periods of both rapid and slower
growth. In 1969, sales by the 50 largest firms rose 6.5 percent over the
previous year, while the sales growth of the entire 500 was 9.7 percent.
Sales growth for the "Second 500" firms was 11.7 percent. In earnings,
the top 50 registered a decline of 4 percent in 1969 compareda rise for
the 500 of 2 percent and a rise of 8.6 percent for the "Second
Much the same pattern appears in earnings per share, a critical
determinant of stock prices in the long run. For the entire decade 1960—69,
the 50 largest firms achieved an average growth rate in earnings per share
of 5.94 percent; for the entire 500 the growth rate was 7.01 percent; for
the "Second 500" it was 7.50 percent; and for the 50 smallest firms of the
"Second 500" it was 10.21 percent.44 In short, the highest growth in sales,
earnings, and opportunities for equity investment has generally been
outside the largest companies.
42Forlune 500 Directory, 1967, p. 1.
43Fortune, May 1970, pp. 182—83; Fortune, June 1970, pp. 982—99.
44Fortune 500 Directory, May 1970, pp. 182—83; Fortune,June 1970, pp. 98—116.The Demand for Corporate Stock 253
b.Banlc Trust Department Equity Management
As noted earlier, there are two major money-management groups in the
financial community, bank trust departments and the mutual fund
organizations. In recent years the differences in management strategy of
these two groups have become pronounced, as have the results. Examina-
tion of these differences is important in analyzing the current flow of
institutional funds to the equity market and in predicting likely trends in
the future.
A trust agreement is an arrangement by which the trustee assumes
fiduciary responsibility for managing assets for the benefit of another.45
The agreement typically defines that responsibility, the degree of discre-
tion of the trustee, and the rules for distributing benefits of the trust. The
definition of fiduciary discretion has many dimensions. Often it limits the
extent of corporate stock and other types of investments; it may impose
limits on the share of funds that may be invested in a single company; and
it may lay out guidelines, indicating which companies are eligible. Also,
state laws and state courts interpret the nature and limits of trustee dis-
cretion differently. In some cases the trustee is limited to selecting from a
"legal list" of eligible investments maintained by many states. Within
the agreed upon limits of fiduciary responsibility trustees typically are
limited by the "prudent man" rule.46
Trust agreements and investment policies vary for different kinds of
accounts, For example, the uncertainty associated with the liquidation
date of many personal trusts forces the trustee to be more attentive to
liquidity and short-run changes in portfolio values. Tax considerations
also matter; for example, corporate pension funds are tax free and hence
have not invested in state and local government securities. However,
despite these differences the percentage of assets invested in stocks by these
three groups in 1968 was nearly identical: 64.1 percent by employee benefit
accounts, 63.8 percent by personal trusts and estates, and 59.6 percent
for employee pension accounts.47
Historically the investment strategy for investing in stock on behalf of
pension funds has been conservative, with most funds invested in large
companies and with turnover rates on such holdings well below those of
mutual funds. The first comprehensive survey of pension fund holdings was
Cf. Austin W. Scott, The Law of Trusts, 3rd ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1967.
For application to pension funds, see Commerce Clearing Houie, Inc., Pension Plan Guide.
Chicago, 1964.
Harvard College versus Amory (1835).
Hanczaryk, op. cit., p. 21.254 InstitutionalInvestors
conducted in 1955 by the New York State Banking Department. The
survey revealed that the stock portion of pension funds trusteed by New
York banks were mainly concentrated in the largest stocks. As of December
31, 1954, almost 61 percent of pension fund investments were in stocks of
companies whose capitalization had a market value in excess of $500
million, with 14 percent in stocks of companies with valuations under
$200 million; the comparable figures for all outstanding common stock
were 52.6 percent and 25 percent respectively.48 The 1956 Fuibright
Committee investigation of thirty large pension funds revealed the same
concentration of stock investments in a few large, well-established com-
panies. From 1953 to 1955, almost 25 percent of the equity investment
of corporate pension funds was in 25 leading companies. In contrast, such
companies attracted only 15 percent of mutual fund investment during
that period.49
Trust departments gradually diversified their equity investment during
the 1950's. The survey of the portfolios often large bank trust departments
for 1958—59 bore this out: only 16.5 percent of purchases were in the
above-mentioned group of 25 companies.50 This process of diversification
has continued into the 1960's. However, turnover rates have remained
relatively stable, about 12 percent, in the decade through 1965—less than
half the level of mutual funds.
The aggregate return on trusteed pension funds can be inferred from
various sources. A questionnaire survey of the largest 200 firms among the
Fortune 500 revealed that the common stock portfolios of these pension
funds appreciated at a compound rate of 7.2 percent from January 1,
1957, to December 31, 1962.51 During that same period the average annual
increase (price appreciation plus dividends) of the DJIA was 9.1 percent;
for the S&P 500 index, 10.9 percent. Dietz found similar results in his
examination of the return on six large pension funds for 1953—62. The
average annual appreciation for the funds was 12.0 percent over the
period versus 13.1 percent for the DJIA and 13.6 percent for Standard and
Poor's index of 425 industrials. There were no subperióds during which the
48 George A. Mooney, Pension and Other Emplqyee Welfare Plans: A Survej of Funds Held
by State and National Banks in New York State, New York State Banking Department, 1955;
and Norman C. Miller, "Concentration in Institutional Common Stocks Portfolios,"
Journal of Finance, March 1961, pp. 40-41.
U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, In.riituiional Investors and the Stock
Market, 1953—1955, Washington, 1956.
50 Murray, op. cit., pp. 81—82.
F. William Graham II and Richard D. Bower, "Corporate Responsibility in Pension
Fund Management," Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University,
unpublished monograph, Exhibits 13 and 14.The Demand for COrporate Stock 255
performanceof the funds differed appreciably from the averages. He also
found no evidence that these pension funds attempted to shift the share of
funds devoted to equities in response to market conditions.52
The results are little different for more recent years. A recent survey of
some 894 profit-sharing pension trusts' records of asset appreciation
during the period 1959—66 reveals much the same The asset size
of these funds ranged from under $50,000 to over $25 million; taken to-
gether they had assets valued at $4.1 billion at year-end 1961, equal to
12 percent of all uninsured pension fund accounts. About one-half of
these funds made their own investment decisions, while the other half
relied on a trustee. Most of the trust agreements did not restrict the trustee
to. the "legal list." Generally bank and trust companies were the trustees,
hence this sample should reflect the experience of a wide group of bank
trustees.
For the 46 largest of these profit-sharing trusts, i.e., all those with assets
in excess of $10 million, the average overall return for the period 1959—63
was 8.4 percent.54 At the end of 1961 these profit-sharing trusts held 64 per-
cent of their funds in common stock. Assuming a return on the nonequity
portion of their investments of 3 to 4 percent implies that these funds have
earned 10.9 to 11.5 percent on the equity portion of the portfolio. This
return is slightly above the return on the DJIA, which rose 7.3 percent in
price over this period and yielded slightly over 3 percent in dividends.
Within this group of 46 profit-sharing trusts, there is a distinct correlation
between rate of return and the share of funds held in equities.55 As one
might suppose, in the 1966 market decline the portfolios of these funds
declined more than the aggregate of all pension funds, 7.9 percent
versus 5.7 percent.58
Finally, the return on all uninsured pension funds for the period 1959—66
has been estimated to be 5.8 percent.57 With roughly 50 percent of the
portfolio in nonequity investments yielding from 3 to 4 percent, the
implied return on the equity portion of the investment is 7.5 to 8.5 percent.
82Peter0. Dietz, Pension Funds: Measuring Investment Performance, New York, Graduate
School of Business Administration, Columbia University and Free Press of Glencoe, 1966,
pp. 80—83.
"Bert L. Metzger, "Investment Practices, Performance, and Management of Profit




67Ibid., p. 359.256 InstitutionalInvestors
During that period the rate of return on an unmanaged portfolio made up
of the DJIA stocks was 8.6 percent.
In short, it appears that historically the average appreciation of equity
investments of the bank trust departments is not significantly different
from that realized by the more conservative stocks of companies with
large capitalizations, as represented, e.g., in the DJIA. What appears to
have occurred as a result of the diversification in trust department invest-
ments in the late 1950's and early 1960's is that average performance now
is better approximated by the more comprehensive stock price indices. As
noted above, concentrating stock investments in the stocks of the companies
with the largest capitalization is likely to result in lower rates of return.
This difference in growth rates has widened since 1966, as evidenced by
the increasing gap between the DJIA and the more comprehensive stock
market indices.
c. The Investment Record of Mutual Funds
The investment record of the mutual fund industry has been scrutinized
several times.58 In every case asset appreciation of the mutual funds was
essentially the same as that of the relevant securities price averages.59 In
the Wharton School examination of the period 1953—58, it was concluded
that the mutual funds had not outperformed the DJIA. The same con-
clusion could be reached in 1964. However, since 1965 the performance of
the "growth funds" has been distinctly better than that of all the popular
averages. In the most recent study, Friend examined forty-one growth
stocks (those in existence at the beginning of 1964) from 1964 to mid-1968.
The mean return exceeded the return on a weighted average of all NYSE
issues—the weights proportionate to the dollar value of stock outstanding
—and was comparable to an unweighted random selection of all NYSE
stocks.6° These weighted and unweighted averages exceeded the return
on the DJIA. This is evident in Table 5-17. As a result, the cumulative
appreciation of an investment in the growth funds over the ten-year
period 1960—69 was well above that realized by the averages, about
145 percent versus 60 percent for the DJIA.
58U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies,
1939: Wharton Report (see note 33, above); SEC, Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth.
Thiswas first noted in the SEC study of the period 1927—37 (Investment Trusts and
Investment Companies, Part II, Chapter VI and Appendix J).
60IrwinFriend, Marshall Blume, and John Crockett, Mutual Funds and Other Institutional
Investors, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1970, pp. 150—52.The Demand for Corporate Stock 257
Thehigher rates of asset appreciation by the growth funds is the result
of adopting a higher-risk strategy, diversifying to smaller companies and
small-capitalization stocks. This strategy, of course, leaves the growth funds
more susceptible to downside risk as well. These funds sustained sizable
losses during the 1969—70 stock market decline. During 1969 the growth
funds depreciated 15.8 percent, comparable to the decline in the DJIA but
slightly more than that in the broader averages, e.g., the NYSE index. In
1970 the performance of the growth funds relative to the market worsened;
during the first six months of 1970, they had fallen 31.0 percent, while the
NYSE index declined about 23 percent. However, for the two and one-
half year period January 1, 1968, to June 1970, the growth funds'
decline was just comparable to that of the NYSE index. Given their much
superior performance relative to the market from 1965 to 1967, their
cumulative appreciation since 1965 still greatly exceeds that of the market.
The mutual funds' gains relative to the market when stock prices were
rising more than offset their disproportionate losses in the market
decline.
These comparisons were made as of June 30, 1970, the last date for
which data were available. Because of the higher-risk strategy adopted by
the growth funds, the low point of a "market cycle" provides the worst
possible basis for comparing their performance to the averages. It seems
unlikely that further stock market declines will be of sufficient size to
invalidate the conclusion that the growth funds can significantly "cu t-
perform" the averages, though at the same time they raise the variance on
returns.
Nor is this conclusion necessarily invalidated by the speculative market
environment of 1967, which contributed to the very high rates of return
of the smaller growth funds. The equities markets did provide unusually
large rewards to speculative investment in small issues during 1967 and
1968. While the NYSE index increased by 23.1 percent in 1967 and 9.7
percent in 1968, the increases on the American Exchange were 76.5 per-
cent and 33.2 percent, and those for the National Quotation Bureau's
over-the-counter index were 54.0 percent and 20.8 percent. Also, the
performance figures of many funds were inflated by the acquisition of
"letter stock," unlisted stock (which the company would list at a subse-
quent registration or offering) purchased from a company at below th.e
market price and valued by the fund each quarter at the current market
price. Acquisition of letter stock was a source of large gains by the pur-
chasing fund if the market price of the company's stock continued up and


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































On the other hand, it is always hazardous to make too much of
"extenuating circumstances" in the stock market. The opportunity for
speculative investment in 1967 was by no means unprecedented. The
downside risk associated with speculative investment, e.g., in "letter
stock," may well be fully reflected in the losses sustained by the growth
funds in 1969—70. In essence, the higher gains by the growth funds over
the entire period since 1965 reflect their realization that market oppor-
tunities were shifting away from the largest companies. It is their wider
diversification and their greater flexibility, enabling them to adjust their
portfolios more rapidly, that have produced the very sharp contrast in
rates of appreciation on equity investments compared to the bank trust
departments.
These and subsequent cmparisons of mean returns do not include
specific measures of the risk element. It is clear that the growth funds
have raised the variability of returns together with their expected value.
Both the expected return and its variability need to be included in measur-
ing portfolio performance.6' The proper measure of risk remains the sub-
ject of some controversy.62 Abstracting from an explicit risk measure in
this discussion is not critical since the differences between the rates of
return for the trust departments and many of the growth funds is very
large; penalties for the variance which would offset .these differences in
expected returns would need to be very large, especially if one had a time
horizon of several years.
One other important dimension to mutual fund performance since 1967
isthe interrelationship between fund performance and fund size.63
Neither the Wharton School study of the period 1953—58, the SEC study
for 1956—65, nor Friend's recent study of the 1964—68 period have revealed
any correlation of mutual fund performance with size, after stratifying
funds by their different objectives.64 However, year to year comparisons
of the growth funds since 1967 reveal that size has been significantly
61 Treynor,"How to Rate Management of Investment Funds," Harvard Business
Review, January-February 1965, pp. 63—79; William F. Sharpe, "Market Fund Perform-
ance," Journal of Business, Supplement, June 1966, pp. 119—30; Ira Horowitz, "The
Reward to Variability Rates and Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Business,
October 1966, pp. 485—88.
82EugeneFama, "Risk and the Evaluation of Pension Fund Portfolio Performance,"
Bank Administration Institute, Park Ridge, Iii., 1969.
63Forthe period 1930—55 the correlation between size and performance was significant
in. only two of the years, and in those two the larger companies performed better than the
smaller ones (ibid., p. 474).
64WhartonReport, pp.210—30; SEC Report, pp.255—73; Friend, Blurne, and Crockett,
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correlatedwith performance, the highest rates of appreciation being
achieved by the smaller funds.
Table 5-18 presents yearly performance of all growth funds, classified
by size of assets in each year, since 1964.65 In 1965 the two funds with
assets in excess of $1 billion had a significantly lower average gain than the
rest, and in 1966 funds with less than $100 million in assets sustained
below-average losses. Beginning in 1967, the size effects are rather pro-
nounced. Average fund appreciation declined markedly with fund size,
except for the Dreyfus Fund, the largest of all, with assets of over $2
billion. None of the ten funds with over $500 million in assets achieved an
increase equal to the mean level of gains by all 37 funds with less than
$300 million in assets at the year's end. In 1968, the same inverse correla-
tion of average performance and fund size appears, again with the excep-
tion of the Dreyfus Fund and excluding one other entry—the Enterprise
Fund—from the size class $500 million to $1 billion.66 In the 1969—70
market decline, the smaller funds sustained the largest losses.67
Several reasons may explain why Friend's recent study did not reveal
these size effects. First, his sample was confined to 44 firms, those in
existence in 1964; this excludes many new smaller firms which tended to
assume more risk. Second, data for the entire 1964—68 period may conceal
the size effects which only appear since 1967. This tends to overstate the
growth of larger funds; many funds classified as large in 1967 were much
smaller when they achieved their highest growth. The typical experience
in the mutual fund industry during this period was for smaller funds with
the highest rates of asset appreciation to attract rather large fund inflows.
Several factors influence these relationships between assets apprecia-
tion and fund size. First, important economies can be realized by manag-
ing larger amounts. There are obvious administrative and management
same analysis was conducted on funds classified as having the objective of
"long-term growth and income." These funds represent a step toward a more conservative
investment policy. The role of size in this class of funds would not be expected on a priori
grounds to be so important, since the objective of a more stable return lends itself to
investment in high-capitalization stocks and implies a lower premium for high turnover
rates. There were no size effects.
66TheEnterprise Fund's performance of + 44.3 percent in 1968 is four times the
average of funds of its size (whose performances range froni + 0.4 to +14.3 percent).
The mean value of this 10-fund group is raised from 7.1 to 11.5 percent when Enterprise
is included. Enterprise's performance has been exceptional; it grew from under $10
million in 1964, and has each year consistently outperformed its competitors of similar size.
(In 1969, it fell by 26.4 percent; by contrast, other funds in its asset class fell 10.9 percent.)
67Inthe first 6 months of 1970, growth funds with assets from $25 million to $100
million declined 30.57 percent, versus —26.7 percent for those with assets over $500











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5The Demand for corporate Stock 263
Nolesto Table 5-10
n.a. =notavailable.
SOURCE: Calculations by the author, based on data reported by Wiesenberger Finan-
cial Services, various years.
aAverageexcludes Enterprise Fund. See— text note 66.
bByasset size as of December 31, 1967.
economies in employing specialized personnel to perform the diverse tasks
of marketing, trading, research, and portfolio management. Also many
cost items akin to overhead can be spread as fund size increases; e.g.,
visits to companies being considered as potential investments, an important
part of the institutional investors' research which those managing small
funds are generally unable to afford. These economies have been well
documented. One study of mutual funds revealed that those funds with
assets over $400 million achieved a per unit cost 50 percent lower than
that of funds with assets below $5 million.68
There are other potential gaIns. For example, larger companies have
greater leverage in buying research or other market information from
brokerage houses because they generate large commissions. The absence
of sufficient taper in commission rates for large transactions provides an
obvious opportunity for those making large-block trades to receive this
sort of nonprice transfer in exchange for their commission business. As in
any regulated market where prices and costs diverge, the competitive
response is that of service or product competition and various nonprice-
transfers.
On the other hand, large funds have little or no size advantage in
dealing in low-capitalization stocks. The "size of the market" in any stock
will limit the amount of money any given investor can place in a stock
without reducing his own liquidity or the flexibility to sell his position.
The capitalization of the company and how closely the stock is held help
determine the size of the market in a stock. A large fund may have to
diversify its portfolio very widely when investing in small companies.
Large funds apparently enjoy no scale economies in investing small
amounts in many issues.
The potential economies and market advantage for large funds have not
been realized in practice, as has become evident from this review of their
investment record. Invariably those with large amounts to manage (both
mutual funds and bank trust departments) have conceded some degree of
°°SECReport, p. 253.264 InstitutionalInvestors
market flexibility by reason of their size. One common tendency is to deal
in the larger companies, which reduces average expected returns. The
largest accumulations of funds have also tended to be less active in the
market. The much lower turnover of trust accounts relative to mutual
funds was noted earlier. Among mutual funds, there is an inverse correla-
tion of turnover rates with fund size.69 This is not to suggest high turnover
as an end in itself, but rather to indicate that the larger fund accumula-
tions are pursuing a different market strategy.
d. Summary and Concluding Observations
The contrast between investment practices and results of the bank trust
departments and those of the smaller, capital-appreciation oriented
mutual funds is striking. The trust departments are essentially investing
with limited risk and achieving results reflecting the rate of equity price
appreciation of the more established companies. The investment return in
the largest companies has steadily fallen below equity returns in the cor-
porate sector generally, a difference which has increased markedly since
1966.
In sharp contrast, some of the mutual funds have assumed more risk and
have achieved records of price appreciation—even discounting "special
circumstances"—which are well above the broadly based averages.
Moreover, these above-average rates of asset appreciation are not being
achieved by the largest funds, e.g., those with assets in excess of $1 billion,
which perform essentially as the broader-based market averages or at best
very marginally above that level.70 Large fund size need not preclude asset
appreciation above the "averages," though this has been the result to
date. Given this experience among the mutual funds, it is hardly sur-
prising that the huge agglomerations of funds managed by the bank trust
departments, in some cases as much as $10 billion in a single bank,
perform essentially as "the market".
The long-term implications for institutional investment of these very
different investment strategies, a contrast which has been clearly drawn
only since 1967, remain to be seen. Risk preferences of institutional
investors vary widely and appear to be changing fairly rapidly over time.
In addition, prices in the capital markets have changed dramatically in
recent years. Price inflation resulted in long-term bond rates of over 8
69WhartonReport, pp. 210—28; SEC Report, pp. 254—55.
70Theseobservations are based on "expectations" in the statistical sense; individual
large funds may perform better.The Demand for Corporate Stock 265
percentfor a period, a rate which compares favorably with returns in the
stock market in recent years, certainly during 1969—70. Moreover, the
losses sustained by the performance funds during the recent stock market
decline will surely be a reminder of the expected yield-risk tradeoff, and
have undoubtedly temporarily undermined the appeal of a riskier market
strategy.
However, reductions in the rate of inflation and the long-term bond rate,
and resumption of economic growth are likely to reward equity holders
once again, raising returns on equity above that of bonds. And unlike
households, institutional investors' preferences for stocks and their port-
folio choices have not been much influenced by previous stock market
declines. This suggests that the long-run shift of financial institutions in
favor of equity investments is likely to continue.
How much risk institutional investors will assume in their equity
investments is more difficult to predict. A return on equity comparable
to the broad market averages will surely continue to be quite acceptable
to many corporate treasurers and other endowment and private trust
accounts. Nevertheless, if professional money managers are able to show
that they can again achieve rates of equity appreciation better than "the
market," as they did in the 1965—70 period, this will very likely entice the
owners of some pension fund and trust accounts. Private investment
advisers and brokers managing special equity funds now offer a range of
options to institutional accounts, allowing them to choose a level of expec-
ted yield and associated risk premium from a continuum ranging between
the two extremes: a very conservative strategy or a high-risk one dealing
in the stocks of the smallest companies. The most attractive policy for
significant amounts of pension and private trust money may well lie.
somewhere between these two end points.w — w- -